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OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
GARTH, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Neville Leslie, a Jamaican alien, has been
incarcerated since March 28, 2008 without a bond hearing.
He now seeks a bond hearing as provided by 8 U.S.C. § 1226,
contending that his continued detention by United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) for four
years is unconstitutional. 1
Leslie’s appeal from the District Court’s denial of his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus reveals a mixture of
agency and court rulings (detailed below), all of which seek
his removal to Jamaica and involve the pre-removal statute (8
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With leave of this court, the American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation and the American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Pennsylvania (“ACLU”) entered this matter as
amici curiae.
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U.S.C. § 1226) and the post-removal statute (8 U.S.C. §
1231). We now remand to the District Court and reverse the
denial of Leslie’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We
also order that Leslie be afforded a bond hearing no later than
ten days from the date this opinion and order are filed.
I.
In 1998, Neville Leslie, a native and citizen of Jamaica
and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was
convicted of a felony offense of conspiracy to possess and
distribute more than fifty grams of “crack” cocaine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. He was subsequently sentenced
to 168 months imprisonment, which he has served. On
March 28, 2008, after Leslie’s release from prison, ICE
issued a warrant for Leslie’s arrest and took Leslie into
custody. He has been incarcerated under ICE custody since
that time.
On April 16, 2008, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) held a
hearing and found Leslie, who waived his right to counsel at
the hearing, removable to Jamaica for having committed an
aggravated felony. Leslie appealed that order to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). His appeal was dismissed on
July 11, 2008. On July 21, 2008, Leslie petitioned this court
for review of the BIA’s decision, and he also moved to stay
his removal on July 24, 2008. On August 14, 2008, this court
granted the stay of removal pending the resolution of his
petition for review. 2
On July 8, 2010, this court, holding that the IJ failed to
inform Leslie of the availability of free legal counsel, granted
Leslie’s petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA
for a new hearing. On December 10, 2010, the BIA
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The record reveals that on November 16, 2009, a post order
custody review was held by DHS, which the government
represents as a “bond hearing.” Leslie represents, however,
that he was not present, that a hearing was not held, and that
he could not pay the $20,000 decreed as bond required. We
cannot regard a proceeding at which neither Leslie nor
counsel representing Leslie was present as a bond hearing.
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remanded the case to the IJ, who scheduled a hearing for
February 22, 2011.
While still engaged before the immigration authorities
and while still awaiting the immigration hearing of February
22, 2011, on February 2, 2011, Leslie filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, challenging his continued
immigration detention without hearing.
First, Leslie claimed that his original conviction was
not an “aggravated felony,” and that he therefore was not
subject to criminal detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Section
1226 concerns the arrest, detention, and release of aliens who
have not yet been ordered to be removed, and, among other
things, authorizes a bond hearing. Leslie also argued that his
detention was unconstitutionally lengthy and that his
continued detention without a bond hearing violated his
procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.
Before Leslie’s habeas corpus petition was ruled on
by the District Court, the IJ held the scheduled February 22,
2011 hearing, where Leslie requested a continuance of his
removal proceedings for “medical reasons.” The IJ continued
the proceedings until March 30, 2011, at which time another
hearing was held. At that hearing, Leslie again challenged
the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and again argued that
his prior conviction was not an “aggravated felony.” The IJ
concluded that the prior conviction was an aggravated felony
and did not decide the constitutional question of unreasonable
detention. The IJ therefore ordered that Leslie be removed to
Jamaica. Leslie appealed this decision to the BIA.
The BIA remanded Leslie’s appeal of the IJ’s order of
removal to the IJ, noting that the audio recording of the
March 30, 2011 hearing and the audio recording of the
immigration judge’s oral decision were missing from the
record. The BIA therefore ordered the immigration judge to
prepare a complete transcript of the March 30, 2011
proceedings and, if necessary, to hold a new hearing.
Meanwhile, on May 10, 2011, the District Court
adopted a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation
4

which recommended denying Leslie’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus “without prejudice to future requests when, and
if, Leslie’s continued detention becomes sufficiently
prolonged to trigger constitutional concerns.” The District
Court then held that Leslie had been convicted of an
aggravated felony and that his detention was not
unreasonable. Leslie timely appealed the denial of his
petition to this court, which we address today.
Leslie was ordered removed by the IJ on December 15,
2011. Leslie appealed this order of removal to the BIA on
December 22, 2011, and on February 3, 2012, DHS requested
that the BIA expedite that appeal. As of this time, Leslie’s
appeal is still pending before the BIA, and Leslie’s detention
is continuing without Leslie having been afforded a bond
hearing.
II.
This appeal requires us to resolve a single issue:
whether the District Court properly determined that Leslie’s
continued detention is reasonable, and that he is therefore not
entitled to a bond hearing. 3
3

Leslie also argues that the District Court erred in referring
his habeas petition to a magistrate judge to prepare a report
and recommendation. Leslie claims, inter alia, that the
referral to a magistrate judge for a report and
recommendation violated his due process rights because he
did not consent to it and that the District Court abused its
discretion in adopting that report and recommendation. This
argument is without merit; Local Rule 73.1(d) for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania provides that civil cases “may be
referred to a magistrate judge at the time of the filing of the
complaint under the rotational assignment plan of the court
and, at the same time, will be assigned to a district court
judge. The magistrate judge, independent of the parties’
consent, is authorized to exercise all the judicial authority that
is provided for by law for a magistrate judge.” Further, under
Local Rule 72.3, after a magistrate judge issues a report and
recommendation, the parties have an opportunity to file
objections to it. Thereafter, under Local Rule 72.3, the
District Court judge to whom the case is assigned must “make
5

We begin by reviewing the statutory framework under
which aliens can be detained during and subsequent to
removal proceedings:
Under the pre-removal statute—8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)—
ICE can detain any alien pending a decision in removal
proceedings against that alien, and can release on bond any
alien not otherwise ineligible for such release. Section 1226
expressly provides for mandatory detention during removal
proceedings of aliens who are removable on account of their
commission of certain enumerated offenses, including
aggravated felonies such as Leslie’s.
Once removal
proceedings terminate in an order of removal, however, the
alien’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).
Under the post-removal statute—8 U.S.C. § 1231—
ICE must remove the alien within 90 days of a final order of
removal, and must detain the alien during that period. Certain
removable aliens, including aliens who, like Leslie, are
removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having
committed an aggravated felony “may be detained beyond the
removal period” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).

a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.”
In this case, Leslie’s petition was assigned to Judge
Conaboy and referred to Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson.
After Magistrate Judge Carlson issued his report and
recommendation, Leslie made objections to it, and Judge
Conaboy properly considered de novo those portions of the
recommendation to which those objections pertained. All of
the procedural requirements for referral to a magistrate judge
were properly followed below; no consent from Leslie was
required to allow the magistrate judge to prepare his report
and recommendation, nor did Judge Conaboy abuse his
discretion in adopting Magistrate Judge Carlson’s report and
recommendation.
6

Because detention under § 1231(a) serves to detain for
removal an alien who will in fact be subjected to removal, the
Supreme Court has held that the extended mandatory
detention provided for by § 1231(a)(6) is constitutional only
if it is not indefinite and when a “significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future” exists.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). In contrast, the
Supreme Court did not expressly place any limits on ICE’s
authority to detain aliens prior to a final order under § 1226.
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003).
This court, however, in considering Zadvydas, has
determined that § 1226 “authorizes detention for a reasonable
amount of time, after which the authorities must make an
individualized inquiry into whether detention is still necessary
to fulfill the statute’s purposes of ensuring that an alien
attends removal proceedings and that his release will not pose
a danger to the community.” Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec.,
656 F.3d 221, 231 (3d Cir. 2011). 4 The court in Diop further
noted that determining the point at which the length of
detention is no longer reasonable is “a fact-dependent inquiry
that will vary depending on individual circumstances. We
decline to establish a universal point at which detention will
always be considered unreasonable.” Id. at 233. The factdependent inquiry must take into account delay caused by
errors which necessitated appeals as well as the extent to
which continuances or other delays favorable to the alien
have lengthened the period of detention. Id. at 233-34.
The Diop court began its “reasonableness” analysis
with the observation that “detention under § 1226 lasts
roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in
which it is invoked, and about five months in the minority of
cases in which an alien chooses to appeal.” Id. (Internal
quotation marks and internal citations omitted). The court
then observed that Diop had been detained for 35 months, and
concluded that such a period of time, approximately six times
longer than the regular period of detention, was unreasonable.
4

Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 231 (3d Cir.
2011) was not filed until after the District Court judge in this
case had rendered his opinion, so that he could not have
known about our analysis.
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Furthermore, as here, the government in Diop argued that the
alien was responsible for a significant portion of that delay
because he had requested continuances and filed several
appeals. The Diop court concluded that as a general principle
“the reasonableness determination must take into account a
given individual detainee’s need for more or less time, as well
as the exigencies of a particular case,” id. at 234, even though
Diop concluded that the government and the courts were
primarily responsible for the delay in Diop’s case.
In other words, Diop laid out a two step-process: a
reviewing court must first determine that a detention has been
unreasonably long, and following such a determination, must
determine whether the unreasonable detention is necessary to
fulfill §1226’s purposes as outlined in Diop, supra.
Because detention under the two statutes is governed
by different standards, we must determine which statute has
provided the authority for Leslie’s detention at a given time.
The government argues that the two years for which Leslie
was detained while this court stayed his removal were
governed under the post-removal statute (§ 1231), and
accordingly, that in assessing the reasonableness of Leslie’s
detention, that time should not be considered. Leslie and the
amici contend that his detention during that time was
governed by the pre-removal statute, § 1226. We agree with
Leslie and amici. 5
The government’s position on Leslie’s habeas petition
is out of step with other jurisdictions and with the reasoning
of Diop. Our review indicates that every circuit to consider
the issue has held that § 1226, not § 1231, governs detention
during a stay of removal. See Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534
F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008); Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130
(2d Cir. 2003); Beijani v. INS, 271 F.3d 670 (6th Cir. 2001)
(abrogated on other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v.
Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006)). But see also Akinwale v.
Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050 (11th Cir. 2002) (assuming that §
5

Judge Sloviter concurs in the result of the majority opinion
and states: “I note with concern the failure of the Attorney
General to cite 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(8) or to discuss its
applicability, if any, to the issues before us.”
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1231 governs detention during a four month judicial stay of
removal without analysis or discussion). Furthermore, insofar
as the purpose of § 1231 detention is to secure an alien
pending the alien’s certain removal, § 1231 cannot explain
nor authorize detention during a stay of removal pending
further judicial review.
Moreover, the express language of § 1231 refers only
to detention “during” and “beyond” “the removal period.”
The removal period refers to the 90 day period between a
statutorily specified event that begins the period and the time
that the alien must in fact be removed.
Section
1231(a)(1)(b)(ii) enumerates the events that can begin a
“removal period,” a list that includes: “If the removal order is
judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal
of the alien, [the date that begins the removal period is] the
date of the court’s final order.” With this language in place,
there can be little doubt that an alien, subject to and within a
stay of removal, cannot yet be in the “removal period” for
§1231 purposes.
Leslie is currently detained “pre-removal” pursuant to
§ 1226. Having determined that Leslie was also detained
under § 1226 during the stay of his removal, Leslie has been
continually detained pursuant to § 1226 since March 28,
2008, a period of nearly four full years. The Diop framework
guides our inquiry into whether detention under that statute is
reasonable.
A comparison of Leslie’s detention to Diop’s makes
clear that Leslie’s detention is unreasonable. In the present
case, Leslie has been detained over a year longer than Diop
had been. Although Leslie has requested and received a
single continuance during that time, that continuance lasted
for approximately five weeks, and cannot credibly be
considered as a factor in the length of his detention. To the
extent that his detention has exceeded the expected five
month period for an appealed removal case, that extra time
has been the result of appeals in which Leslie has prevailed;
his initial appeal to this court was pending for nearly two
years. Following this court’s order in that appeal, Leslie’s
next hearing was not scheduled for almost seven months, and
following that hearing, approximately six months passed
9

during the pendency of Leslie’s appeal to the BIA, which was
delayed and ultimately remanded for further proceedings, due
entirely to clerical errors made by the immigration judge.
“Although an alien may be responsible for seeking relief, he
is not responsible for the amount of time that such
determinations may take.” Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 272
(6th Cir. 2003).
In short, over the course of his nearly four year
detention, Leslie is responsible for a five week delay for
unspecified medical reasons, and for the delay caused by his
pursuit of bona fide legal challenges to his removal. To
conclude that Leslie’s voluntary pursuit of such challenges
renders the corresponding increase in time of detention
reasonable, would “effectively punish [Leslie] for pursuing
applicable legal remedies,” Oyedeji v. Ashcroft, 332 F. Supp.
2d 747, 753 (M.D. Pa. 2004), and we decline the
government’s invitation to adopt such a position.
We therefore hold that Leslie’s detention is
unreasonably long, and he is therefore entitled to “an
individualized inquiry into whether detention is still necessary
to fulfill the statute’s purposes of ensuring that an alien
attends removal proceedings and that his release will not pose
a danger to the community.” Diop, 656 F.3d at 231. 6
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s order
denying Leslie’s petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus will be
reversed, and Leslie’s appeal will be remanded to the District
Court with instructions to conduct an individualized bond
hearing as required by Diop within ten days of the date when
this opinion and order are filed.
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See footnote 4 of this opinion.
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